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SERVICE OF PROCESS ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS NOT ADMITTED
TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE
At one time corporations were thought to be incapable of migration
beyond the borders of their state of incorporation,' and as a result,
they could not be sued elsewhere. 2 Even during the period of adher-
ence to this doctrine, however, courts were forced to recognize that
agents of a corporation could enter other states3 and that it was unjust
to continue to follow a dogma that in many cases bestowed upon
foreign corporations an exemption from liability, and in all cases worked
an inconvenience upon residents of the state.4 Registration and licensing
statutes, requiring the appointment of an agent to receive service of
process as a condition to entry into a state eliminated much of the
inconvenience occasioned by the non-suability of a foreign corporation,
but when the out-of-state corporation entered a state without first
complying with its laws, the old difficulty remained.
Chapter 60 of the Acts of 1939 (Burns Supplement Title 25-316)
represents the Indiana legislature's attempt to provide a means of serv-
ing process on foreign corporations which have not been formally
admitted to do business in Indiana. 5 The method of the statute is
to make the doing of a business act or acts within the state equivalent
to the appointment of the Secretary of State as agent of the corporation
to receive service in actions arising out of the business activity in the
state. Chapter 60 affords a means to reach these outlaw corporations
by judicial action, to (1) private persons whose claims arise out of
dealings with the foreign corporation within the state, and (2) the
state itself, to collect the statutory penalty for entering the state in
1 Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839), 13 Pet. (38 U. S.) 519, 10 L. Ed. 274;
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French (1855), 18 How. (59 U. S.) 404, 15 L. Ed. 451;
Newell v. Great Western Ry. (1869), 19 Mich. 336. And see Willis, (1934),
Corporations and the United States Const. 8 U. of Cinn. L. R. 1.
2 Peckham v. Inhabitants of North Parish (1834-), 16 Pick. (Mass.) 274;
M'Queen v. Middletown Manufacturing Co. (1819), 16 Johnson (N. Y.) 5;
Shambe v. Delaware & H. R. Co. (1923), 288 Pa. St. 240, 135 A. 755.
3 See, Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839), 13 Pet. (38 U. S.) 519, 10 L. Ed.
274; Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French (1855), 18 How. (59 U. S.) 404, 15 L. Ed.
451; Newell v. Great Western Ry. (1869), 19 Mich. 336.
4 See, St. Clair v. Cox (1882), 106 U. S. 350, 1 S. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222;
Fead, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations (1926), 24 Mich. L. R. 633.
5 The provision as to admitted corporations is found in Burns Ind. Stat.
Ann. (1933) § 25-313.
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violation of its laws. 6 The act, if valid, will be operative in the case
of foreign corporations engaging in business in the state but whose
agents cannot be located, and in the case of a foreign corporation which
has transacted business in the state, but has withdrawn its agents and
ceased its activity by the time suit is filed.
The service of process contemplated is actual personal service, service
upon an agent duly authorized to receive it being regarded as service
upon the principal. 7 The agent designated is the official occupying the
office of Secretary of State, not a particular individual in that office.8
The Jurisdictional Generality. Under the due process clause, 9 a
judgment is not valid unless the defendant was subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the court, and was given notice and an opportunity to be heard.' 0
Notice is given a foreign corporation when service is had on a properly
authorized agent." A foreign corporation is said to be subject to juris-
diction when it has consented' 2 to the exercise of jurisdiction, or when
6 The statutory penalty of not over $10,000, imposed by Burns Ind. Stat.
(1933) § 25-314, if made collectible from these fly-by-night corporations, should
prove a not inconsiderable source of revenue to the state.
7 See, St. Clair v. Cox (1882), 106 U. S. 350, 1 S. Ct. 354-, 27 L. Ed. 222;
Hess v. Pawloski (1927), 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091. The
statute is not an innovation on the matter of suits against foreign corporations
where the action is in rem or quasi in rem. When the proper requisites exist,
e.g., when the foreign corporation owns land in the state, constructive service is
possible. Burns Ind. Ann. Stat. (1933) § 2-804. See, Caledonia Coal Co. v.
Baker (1905), 196 U. S. 432, 25 S. Ct. 375, 49 L. Ed. 540.
8 Changes in the holder of the office will be immaterial. Changes in the
office whose occupier is to be the agent have been sustained. Woodward v.
Mutual Res. Life Ins. Co. (1904), 178 N. Y. 485, 71 N. E. 10 (1904).
9 Though not a citizen, a corporation is a person and within the protection
of the due process clause. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co.
(1886), 118 U. S. 394, 6 S. Ct. 1132.
10 Goldey v. Morning News (1895), 156 U. S. 518, 15 S. Ct. 559, 39 L. Ed.
517; Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-resident Motorists (1926), 39 Harv. L. R. 563
at p. 568.
11 See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), § 91.
12 If the corporation has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction, it may
be sued in the state whether it is "doing business" there or not. Farmers
Educational and Co-op Union v. Farmers Educ. and Co-op Union of America
(Minn. 1940), 289 N. W. 884. Rest., Conflicts, § 90; See Smolik v. Phila. &
Reading Coal and Iron Co. (1915), 222 Fed. 148. Consent may be given by
appearing and defending the action. Fitzgerald & Mallory Constr. Co. v.
Fitzgerald (1890), 137 U. S. 98, 11 S. Ct. 36, 34 L. Ed. 60S; FLETCHER, CYCLO-
PEDIA CORPORATIONS (1932) § 8643. The consent contemplated here must be
real, not fictional or implied (Rest., Conflicts, § 90, Comment) and when real
consent is given, it extends to any cause of action whether local or transitory,
if the statute will bear that interpretation. Penna. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue
Mining Co. (1917), 243 U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610; Smolik v. Phila.
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it is "doing business" in the state. Inasmuch as corporations which
operate in Indiana in violation of entrance-requirement laws cannot in
any real sense be said to have consented to being sued in local courts,
it is the "doing business" basis of jurisdiction which must be considered
in determining the constitutionality of the provisions of Chapter 60.1
ANY TRANSACTION v. DOING BusINEss
Section 1. of the act provides that ". . .. the engaging in any trans-
action or the doing of any business in this state by any foreign corporation not
licensed nor admitted to do business in this state * * * shall be deemed
equivalent to an appointment by such foreign corporation of the secretary of
state, or his successor in office, to be the true and lawful attorney and agent of
such foreign corporation upon whom may be served all lawful processes, writs,
notices, or orders. . .. 15
As indicated by the italics, Section 1 of the act provides that "any
transaction" as well as "doing any business" by an unlicensed foreign
corporation within the state will subject the corporation to the juris-
diction of Indiana courts. In light of the general principle that, in
absence of consent, a corporation must be "doing business" in a state
to be subject to the jurisdiction of its courts, and the numerous authori-
ties to the effect that single or occasional transactions do not amount to
and Reading Coal and Iron Co. (1915), 222 F. 148; Reynolds v. Missouri,
K. & T. Ry. Co. (1912), 228 Mass. 584, 117 N. E. 913. Consent may be implied
from the corporation's doing business in the state but in such case the corpora-
tion is not suable on causes of action arising outside the state. Old Wayne
Life Assn. v. McDonough (1907), 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345;
Morris and Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co. (1936), 81 F. 2d 346. But compare
The Madrid [1937] P. 40, decided in 1936, contra.
13 Shambe v. Delaware & H. R. Co. (1927), 288 Pa. St. 240, 135 A. 755;
Rest., Conflicts, § 92; Fead, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations (1926),
24 Mich. L. R. 633; FLETCHER, § 8713; Willis CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936),
p. 295. See cases cited in Note 38.
14 That judgments meet the requirements of due process is accentuated by
realization that normally there will be double opportunity for due process
attack. In most cases it will be necessary to sue on the judgment in the
corporations' home state, or in a state where the corporate property is located.
A judgment lacking in due process is not entitled to full faith and credit.
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French (1855), 18 How. (59 U. S.) 404, 15 L. Ed. 451;
Goldey v. Morning News (1895), 156 U. S. 518, 15 S. Ct. 559, 39 L. Ed. 517;
Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough (1907) 204- U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236, 51
L. Ed. 345; Compagnie Du Port de Rio de Janeiro v. Mead Morrison Mfg.
Co. (1927), 19 F. 2d 163. The U. S. Supreme Court has refused to permit the
rendition of judgments which are enforceable in the rendering state but not
elsewhere. Riverside Mills v. Menefee (1915), 237 U. S. 189, 35 S. Ct. 579,
59 L. Ed. 910.
15 The italics are the writer's.
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"doing business," 16 the question squarely presented is, whether the "any
transaction" provision of section 1 is unconstitutional?
To sustain the taking of jurisdiction over a corporation that has
done only single or occasional acts within the state, one of two alterna-
tives are available: (1) The cases saying that single or occasional acts
are not "doing business" may be over-ruled, and the term redefined to
include single acts. (2) "Doing business" may be retained in its pres-
ent meaning, but its function be limited (a) to determine when a
corporation is within the scope of a statute making "doing business"
the sole requisite for the imposition of certain consequences other than
subjection to the jurisdiction of local courts, and, (b) as one, but not
the only, test of when it is reasonable for the jurisdiction of local courts
to attach.
Alternative (2) is submitted as the most desirable course. The
logic favoring its adoption is that it recognizes that many of the deci-
sions on "doing business" are merely interpretative of statutes embody-
ing the term,' 8 and that it permits the constitutionality of attempts
16 Hutchison v. Chase & Gilbert (1930), 45 F. 2d 139; Whitaker v. Mac-
Fadden Publications (1939), 105 F. 2d 44; Apgar v. Altoona Glass Co. (1921),
92 N. J. Eq. 352, 113 A. 593; Shambe v. Delaware & H. R. Co. (1927), 288
Pa. St. 240, 135 A. 755; Comment 33 Yale 547 (1924); Scott, Jurisdiction over
Nonresident Motorists (1926), 39 Harv. L. R. 563 at p. 579, note 39; FLETCHER,
§ 8715.
17 See FLETCHER, § 8712. "Doing business" is used to determine whether
the foreign corporation is to be denied the use of courts: Chattanooga Bldg.
etc. Assn. v. Denson (1903), 189 U. S. 408, 23 S. Ct. 630, 47 L. Ed. 870;
Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co. (1927), 275 U. S. 274, 48 S. Ct. 124, 72 L. Ed.
277; Baden v. Washington Loan & Trust Co. (1919), 133 Md. 602, 105 A.
860; Nicolai v. Sugarman Iron & Metal Co. (1922), 23 Ariz. 230, 202 P. 1075.
A foreign corporation may be doing business within a state so as to be amenable
to process (jurisdiction), yet not obtain a status to be regulated by a state
or to bring it within licensing requirements. Liquid Veneer Corporation v.
Smuckler (1937), 90 F. 2d 196.
18 Empire Milling & Min. Co. v. Tombstone Mill & Min. Co. (1900), 100
F. 910; Whitaker v. Macfadden Publications (1939), 105 F. 2d 44; Keokuk &
Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Curtin-Howe Corp. (1937), 223 Ia. 915, 274 N. W. 78.
See, St. Clair v. Cox (1882), 106 U. S. 350, 1 S. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222;
FLETCHER, § 8762. It has been argued that the problem of "doing business"
is entirely one of statutory interpretation. See, Farmers' and Merchants' Bank
v. Fed. Reserve Bank (1922), 286 F. 566; Fead, Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporations (1926), 24 Mich. L. R. 633; Stimson, Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporations (1933), 18 St. Louis L. R. 195. Although it is true that jurisdic-
tion is exerciseable only to the extent authorized by statute, Chipman v. Thomas
B. Jeffrey Co. (1920), 251 U. S. 373, 40 S. Ct. 172, 64 L. Ed. 314; Chipman v.
Thomas B. Jeffery Co. (1919), 260 F. 856 approved-withdrawal makes differ-
ence-33 Harv. L. R. 730; Thompson v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. of U. S. A. (D. C.
Mo, 1928), 28 F. 2d 877; Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co. (1936), 81 F. 2d
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to extend the jurisdiction of state courts to be examined on the true
issue-whether the extension is a reasonable exercise of the state's
police power. Although it may not be reasonable in every case for
a state to take jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which has done
only single or occasional acts within a state, the door will be open
should the circumstances of particular cases, or generally changed con-
ditions throughout the state, make this desirable.
"Doing business" has not been uniformly regarded as the basis on
which corporations are suable outside their state of origin.19 When
corporations once operated within a state but have withdrawn they
have been made subject to jurisdiction under statutes providing that
the agency created during the time of doing business shall remain effec-
tive for this purpose. 20 Most of these cases involve insurance com-
346, the problem is also of the constitutional validity of the statute which
attempts to confer jurisdiction. Thurman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.
(1926), 254 Mass. 569, 151 N. E. 63, 46 A. L. R. 563; Tauza v. Susquehanna
Coal Co. (1917), 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915; FLETCHER, §8708.
19 The New York Courts were particularly unfavorable to the requirement.
See, Grant v. Cananea Consol. Copper Co. (1907), 189 N. Y. 241, 82 N. E.
191, recognizing the Federal rule but expressing a contrary preference. One
Federal District judge devoted forty-four pages to disproving "doing business"
as the jurisdictional basis actually used by the Supreme Court. Cochran, J.,
in Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Fed. Reserve Bank (1922), 286 F. 566.
A New Jersey Court has indicated that there may be exceptions to the require-
ment as to causes of action arising within the forum state. Apgar v. Altoona
Glass Co. (1921), 92 N. J. Eq. 352, 113 A. 593. A Federal Master refused
to quash a service on a corporation the activity of which did not meet the
"doing business" test in the belief that this had been the decision of Judge L.
Hand in a previous case. The case relied on was Premo Specialty Co. v.
Jersey Cream Co. (1912), 200 F. 352, 118 C. C. A. 458, 43 L. R. A. (NS) 1015.
Judge Hand, in reversing the master, expressly denied that that had been
the decision in the earlier case. Hunan v. Northern Region Supply Corp.
(1920), 262 F. 181. This is particularly interesting in that Judge Cochran,
in his decision, cited above, repudiating the "doing business" concept, gives
Judge Hand credit for first seeing the light. Compare the cases declaring that
solicitation is not "doing business," Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Ry. (1907), 205 U. S. 530, 27 S. Ct. 595, 51 L. Ed. 916; Thurman v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1926), 254 Mass. 569, 151 N. E. 63, 46 A. L. R. 563,
with those finding solicitation to amount to "doing business" becaus it resulted
in shipments. International Harvester Co. v. Ky. (1914), 234 U. S. 579, 34
S. Ct. 944, 58 L. Ed. 1479; La Porte Heinekamp Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co.
(1928), 24 F. 2d 861; Tanza v. Susquehanna Coal Co. (1917), 220 N. Y. 259,
115 N. E. 915. At least one writer has squarely taken the position that a single,
isolated act is not enough to subject a corporation to jurisdiction. Stimson,
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations (1933), 18 St. Louis L. R. 195.
20 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley (1899), 172 U. S. 602, 19 S. Ct. 308,
43 L. Ed. 569; Mutual Reserve etc. Assoc. v. Phelps (1903), 190 U. S. 147,
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panics, which may be differentiated in that policies remain outstanding
in the state, but unfortunately for this explanation, this has not been
true in every case.21 In many cases of this kind, suability has been
limited to local causes of action, 22 due to unwillingness of courts to
try foreign causes. The ignoring of the "doing business" requirement
has been sought to be explained on the ground that the breach of legal
duty occurred when the corporation was still "doing business," 23 but
this explanation is weakened by other decisions to the effect that the
corporation must be "doing business" at the time service is attempted.
24
In determining the jurisdiction of a state over foreign corporations
which have done only single or isolated acts within its territory, the
non-resident motorists statute cases are particularly informative. In
these cases the single act of driving a car within the state by a non-
resident, is sufficient to subject the non-resident to jurisdiction. 25 The
validity of these statutes rest solely on the ground that such measures
are reasonable for the protection and convenience of citizens of the
state. 26  In the non-resident motorist cases, the foreign corporation
cases are relied upon as authority27 despite the few cases denying that
23 S. Ct. 707, 47 L. Ed. 987; Am. Ry. Express Co. v. Royster Co. (1927),
273 U. S. 274, 47 S. Ct. 355, 71 L. Ed. 642; Washington v. Superior Court
(1933), 289 U. S. 361, 53 S. Ct. 624, 77 L. Ed. 1256; Collier v. Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Assn. (1902), 119 F. 617; Davis v. Kansas & Texas Coal Co.,
(1904), 129 F. 149; Western Grocer Co. v. N. Y. Oversea Co., Inc. (1924),
296 F. 269; Brown-Ketcham Iron Works v. Swift Co. (1913), 53 Ind. App.
530, 100 N. E. 584; Tucker v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. (1919), 232
Mass. 224, 122 N. E. 285; Frazier v. Steel & Tube of America (1926), 101
W. Va. 327, 132 S. E. 723. The statute may expressly provide for service
after withdrawal, or may be judicially interpreted to this effect.
21 Am. Ry. Express Co. v. Royster Co. (1927), 273 U. S. 274, 47 S. Ct. 355,
71 L. Ed. 64-2; Davis v. Kansas & Texas Coal Co. (1904), 129 F. 149; Western
Grocer Co. v. N. Y. Oversea Co., Inc. (1924), 296 F. 269. See, Frazier v. Steel
& Tube of America (1926), 101 W. Va. 327, 132 S. E. 723.
22 Chipman v. Thos. B. Jeffery Co. (1919), 260 F. 856, aff. 251 U. S. 373,
40 S. Ct. 172, 64 L. Ed. 314. See Recent Cases, 33 Harv. L. R. 730.
23 See, Frazier v. Steel & Tube of America (1926), 101 W. Va. 327, 132 S. E.
723.
24 International Harvester v. Kentucky (1914), 234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944,
58 L. Ed. 1479; Golden, Belknap & Swartz v. Connersville Wheel Co. (1918),
252 F. 904.
25 Hess v. Pawloski (1927), 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091.
Under these statutes the service is on a state official. Apparently these statutes
would extend to permit suits against corporations as well as individuals.
26 Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists (1926), 39 Harv. L. R. 563.
27 Hess v. Pawloski (1927), 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091. And
see Scott Juri,~diction over Noqresident Motorists (1926), 39 Harv, L. R. 563.
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any relationship exists.2 8 Jurisdiction over non-resident motorists is
a police power consideration, 29 and the great breadth of this power in
the states is well recognized. 3 ' If the police power of a state may be
exercised to regulate non-resident automobilists as a dangerous instru-
mentality, why may not it be exercised when foreign corporations have
caused injury to citizens of the state? The answer is that it may be,
and is, so exercised. But can it operate to provide jurisdiction over a
corporation doing single or casual, isolated acts within the state?
Anything so fundamental as jurisdiction should not be based on a
mere figure of speech.3 2 Yet the term "doing business" when seen
in its true chameleon character is nothing more. The question should
be rested squarely on whether it is reasonable that the corporation be
subjected to suit in the particular jurisdiction, in light of the facts of
the particular case and the nature of the business for which the cor-
poration is organized.33  "Cases holding that jurisdiction was not
acquired although the corporation transacted some business in the
state at a time prior to service ought not to be explained on the ground
28 Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Curtin-Howe Corp. (1937), 223 Ia. 915,
274 N. W. 78.
29 Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Res. Motorists (1933), 32 Mich. L.
R. 325.
30 Sligh v. Kirkwood (1915), 237 U. S. 52, 35 S. Ct. 501, 59 L. Ed. 835.
31 Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-Residents Doing Business Within a State
(1919), 32 Harv. L. R. 871; Willis, Corporations and the United States Const.
(1934.), 8 U. of Cinn. L. R. 1.
32 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert (1930), 45 F. 2d 139; Scott, Jurisdiction
over Nonresident Motorists (1926), 39 Harv. L. R. 563 at p. 576.
33 Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Fed. Reserve Bank (1922), 286 F. 566.
See, Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-Residents Doing Business Within a State
(1919), 32 Harv. L. R. 871. This would afford a supportable basis for the
early New York cases in which "doing business" was not required to support
jurisdiction if a proper agent could be served. Pope v. Terre Haute Car Co.
(1881), 87 N. Y. 137. An inkling that by proper enactment the legislature
could provide for service on an agent of a foreign corporaton not doing business
in the state is found in Caledonian Coal Co. v. Baker (1905), 196 U. S. 432, 25
S. Ct. 375, 49 L. Ed. 540. This theory of jurisdiction ties up nicely with the
argument in favor of broader powers of service advanced by Cook, The Powers
of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (1919), 28 Yale L. J. 421.
Note also that the statement "An extension to a corporation of the rule stated in
§ 84 would expose a foreign corporation doing a single act within a state to the
jurisdiction of the courts of that state as to a cause of action arising out of such
act although the corporation could not be considered as doing business within
the state under the rule stated in § 167, Comment a," found in Comment b,
REsr., CoNrLicrs, § 89, does not deny that the extension is not logical or
reasonable.
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that the transactions were merely isolated or occasional." 3 4  This rea-
soning is strengthened by recalling that a corporation is not entitled
to any protection under the privileges and immunities clause,8 5 yet
that an individual has this protection.3 6 Does it not seem rather irra-
tional that under the due process clause the corporation should receive
the greater protection-the corporation not making itself subject to
jurisdiction by committing casual acts outside its home state, while an
individual may ?s
Assuming that the real crux of the determination of jurisdiction over
foreign corporations is whether the state may reasonably exert its police
power to assume jurisdiction, what are we to do with those cases in
which attempted service has been flatly quashed because the foreign
corporation was not found to be "doing business" in the state
s s Of
what value are the dicta and expression of opinion that "doing business"
34 Stimson, Jurisdiction ov'er Foreign Corporations (1933), 18 St. Louis L. R.
195. Mr. Stimson makes this statement in connection with his argument that
jurisdiction should be based on an agency theory.
35 Paul v. Virginia (1868), 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 168, 19 L. Ed. 357; Willis,
Corporations and the United States Const. (1934), 8 U. of Cinn. L. R. 1.
36 Flexner v. Farson (1919), 248 U. S. 289, 39 S. Ct. 97, 63 L. Ed. 250;
Hess v. Pawloski (1927), 274- U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091; Culp,
Process in Actions Against Non-Res. Motorists (1933), 32 Mich. L. R. 325.
37 "The constant tendency of judicial decision in modern times has been in
the direction of putting corporations upon the same footing as natural persons in
regard to the jurisdiction of suits by or against them." Barrow Steamship Co.
v. Kane (1898), 170 U. S. 100, 106, 18 S. Ct. 526, 42 L. Ed. 964-. REST., CoN-
FLICS, § 89, Comment b.
38 Fitzgerald & Mallory Const. Co. v. Fitzgerald (1890), 137 U. S. 98, 11
S. Ct. 36, 34- L. Ed. 608; Kendall v. American Automatic Loom Co. (1904), 198
U. S. 477, 25 S. Ct. 768, 49 L. Ed. 1133; Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Ry. (1907), 205 U. S. 530, 27 S. Ct. 595, 51 L. Ed. 916; Peterson v. Chicago, R. I.
& Pac. Ry. Co. (1907), 205 U. S. 364, 27 S. Ct. 513, 51 L. Ed. 608; Herndon-
Carter Co. v. James N. Norris, Son & Co. (1912), 224 U. S. 496, 32 S. Ct. 550,
56 L. Ed. 857; Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin (1917), 243 U. S. 264, 37
S. Ct. 280, 61 L. Ed. 710; Rosenberg Co. v. Curtin Brown Co. (1923), 260 U. S.
516, 43 S. Ct. 170, 67 L. Ed. 372; Bank of America v. Whitney Bank (1923), 261
U. S. 171, 43 S. Ct. 311, 67 L. Ed. 594; Canon Manufacturing Company v. Cudahy
Packing Co. (1925), 267 U. S. 333, 45 S. Ct. 250, 69 L. Ed. 634; Compagnie Du
Port de Rio de Janeiro v. Mead Morrison Mfg. Co. (1927), 19 F. 2d 163;
Wilhelm v. Consolidated Oil Corp. (1936), 84 F. 2d 739; Morris & Co. v.
Skandinavia Ins. Co. (1936), 81 F. 2d 346; Whitaker v. Macfadden Publications
(1939), 105 F. 2d 44; Roark v. American Distilling Co. (1939), 97 F. 2d 297;
Truck Parts v. Briggs Clarifier Co. (1938), 25 F. Supp. 602; Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Assn. v. Boyer (1900), 62 Kan. 31, 61 P. 387; Hunter v. Mutual
Reserve Life Ins. Co. (1906), 184 N. Y. 136, 76 N. E. 1072, aff. 218 U. S. 573,
31 S. Ct. 127.
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is an essential element to jurisdiction? 39 It is submitted that "doing
business" will become a principal test of when it is reasonable to
exercise jurisdiction. In other words, it is reasonable for a state to
take jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the corporation is
doing business in the state; it may not be reasonable to do so when the
corporation is not "doing business." 40  It will still be necessary for the
United States Supreme Court to make the final decision as to when
jurisdiction exists, and to decide each case on its particular facts. The
advantage in the change in emphasis from "doing business" to "reason-
ableness" lies in obviating the necessity of overruling the single or
occasional transaction cases, and, at least in jurisdictional cases, the
reduction in number of redefinitions of "doing business."'4 1 "Reason-
ableness," in law is a more understandable concept than the technical
one of "doing business," and no one will question that what is reason-
able may and will change with the progress of time and the alteration
of circumstance. The various theories of consent 42 or subjection 43 to
jurisdiction and of presence 44 in the jurisdiction will fit into the "reason-
ableness" theory in the same manner, and the confusion which they
inject thus may be eliminated. Most important, however, the door
will be open for the courts to sustain the taking of jurisdiction over
foreign corporations when they have transacted some business in the
39 See, Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane (1898), 170 U. S. 100, 18 S. Ct. 526,
42 L. Ed. 964; Hunan v. Northern Region Supply Corp. (1920), 262 F. 181;
Haggin v. Comptoir D'Escompte De Paris (1889), L. R. 23 Q. B. Div. 519, 58
L. J. (Q. B.) 508; La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Thomas Law &
Co. (1899), A. C. 431; Logan v. Bank of Scotland (1904), 2 K. B. 495; Hals-
bury's Laws of England (2nd ed.), Vol. V, § 1510, note 0; Culp, Constitutional
Problems Arising from Service of Process on Foreign Corporations (1935), 19
Minn. L. R. 375; FLETCHER, § 8714.
40 See, Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert (1930), 45 F. 2d 139; Farrier, Suits
Against Foreign Corporations as a Burden on Interstate Commerce (1933), 17
Minn. L. R. 270.
41 The difficulty and confusion that arises over the meaning of the term
"doing business" is brought out in St. Louis Southern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Alex-
ander (1912), 227 U. S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 59 L. Ed. 486; REST., CONFLICTS, § 167;
Comment, Service of Process Upon Foreign Corporations (1924), 33 Yale 547;
FLETCHER, § 8711.
42 See, Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co. (1936), 81 F. 2d 346; Reynolds
v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1917), 228 Mass. 584, 117 N. E. 913, aff. 255 U. S.
565, 41 S. Ct. 446, 65 L. Ed. 788 (1921).
43 See, St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Alexander (1912), 227
U. S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 59 L. Ed. 486; Apgar v. Altoona Glass Co. (1921), 92
N. J. Eq. 352, 113 A. 593; Haggin v. Comptoir D'Escompte De Paris (1889),
L. R. 23 Q. B. Div. 519, 58 L. J. (Q. B.) 508.
44 See, Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert (1930), 45 F. 2d 139; Wilhelm v.
Consolidated Oil Corp. (1936), 84 F. 2d 739.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
state, but not enough to meet the "doing business" requirement. For
if citizens of a state are being harmed and the state is being denied
license fees and taxes by sufficient numbers of foreign corporations
which occasionally operate in the state in violation of law, it may be
said that to take jurisdiction over these corporations is reasonable. The
determination whether such conditions exist should be left to the legis-
lature. Chapter 60 apparently represents the assembly's decision that
such conditions do exist in Indiana.
Other Limitations. It remains to be considered whether there are other
limits on the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations aside
from the "doing business" requirement. The issue can be put in this
way: are there circumstances under which the corporation has done
sufficient acts within the state to give the state jurisdiction, but because
of other factors, jurisdiction can not, or will not, be exercised?
Although it seems clear that a foreign corporation which does busi-
ness in a state may be subjected to suit in the state even though the
business done is purely inter-state,4 5 if the effect of permitting suit is
found by a court to be unreasonably burdensome on interstate com-
merce, jurisdiction may not be exercised.4 6 When interstate commerce
is unduly burdened is again a decision over which the Supreme Court
exercises the final word. Under circumstances nearly identica47 to
those of the cases where an unreasonable burden was found, courts
have declared the burden to be not unreasonable simply because the
plaintiff was suing in his principal place of business,48 or at his resi-
dence.4 9  The test of reasonableness here will be that of balancing the
45 Shambe v. Delaware & H. R. Co. (1927), 288 Pa. St. 240, 135 A. 755;
International Harvester v. Kentucky (1914), 234- U. S. 579, 34- S. Ct. 944, 58
L. Ed. 1479. In the Harvester case, the court said: "True, it has been held
time and again that a state cannot burden interstate commerce or pass laws
which amount to the regulation of such commerce; but this is a long way from
holding that the ordinary process of the courts may not reach corporations
carrying on business within the state which is wholly of an interstate commerce
character. Such corporations are within the state, receiving the protection of its
courts, and may, and often do, have large properties located within the state."
46 Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co. (1923), 262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556,
67 L. Ed. 996; Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Mix (1929), 278 U. S. 492, 49 S. Ct.
207, 73 L. Ed. 470; Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Terte (1932), 284 U. S. 284,
52 S. Ct. 152, 76 L. Ed. 295. Dicta, Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert (1916),
239 U. S. 560, 36 S. Ct. 168, 60 L. Ed. 439.
47 The identical nature, obviously, is not admitted by the courts.
48 International Milling Co. v. Columbia Co. (1934), 292 U. S. 511, 54 S. Ct.
797, 78 L. Ed. 1396.
49 Griffin v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. (1928), 28 F. 2d 998. But cf.
Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Mix (1929), 278 U. S. 492, 49 S. Ct. 207, 73 L. Ed.
470, where residence, acquired simply to maintain suit, was found unsufficient to
remove the burden on interstate commerce.
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inconvenience to the plaintiff against the degree of interference with
interstate commerce. 50
It must be kept in mind that the requirement as to service of process
on foreign corporations is a dual one. Under the test proposed, it
must be reasonable for the state to exercise jurisdiction, and service
must be upon a proper agent of the company. 5' The propriety of
serving a particular agent will depend largely on the mandate of the
statute. It has been held in some cases that the agent served must be
in the state in pursuit of a corporate function. 52 In the majority of
cases, however, it is said that if the corporation is otherwise subject to
suit, service upon any agent of sufficient representative capacity is valid.53
The problem of the agent to be served does not arise under Chapter 60,
of course, as the act being valid, service on the secretary of state is
clearly proper.54
Finally, in a few cases, even though jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration unquestionably exists, and although no problem of burdening
interstate commerce is raised, the court may decline to hear the case
presented. Most common of these cases are those involving foreign
causes of action5 5 or the internal affairs of corporate business.5 6
50 Farrier, Suits v. Foreign Corporations as a Burden on Interstate Commerce
(1932), 17 Minn. L. R. 270, 381; Note, 42 Harv. L. R. 1062 (1929).
51 St. Clair v. Cox (1882), 106 U. S. 350, 1 S. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222; Peterson
v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co. (1907), 205 U. S. 364-, 27 S. Ct. 513, 51 L. Ed.
608; St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Alexander (1912), 227 U. S.
218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 57 L. Ed. 486; Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin (1917),
243 U. S. 264, 37 S. Ct. 280, 61 L. Ed. 710; Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v.
Fed. Reserve Bank (1922), 286 F. 566.
52 Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works (1903), 190 U. S. 406, 23 S. Ct. 728,
47 L. Ed. 1113; Reeves v. Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 121 Ga. 561, 49 S. E. 674,
70 L. R. A. 513, 2 Ann. Cas. 207.
53 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley (1899), 172 U. S. 602, 19 S. Ct. 308, 43
L. Ed. 569; Premo Specialty Co. v. Jersey Cream Co. (1912), 200 F. 352, 118
C. C. A. 458, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1015; Rush v. Foos Manufacturing Co. (1898),
20 Ind. App. 515, 51 N. E. 143; Atkinson v. U. S. Operating Co. (1915), 129
Minn. 232, 152 N. W. 410; Fuchbond v. C. & A. R. R. Co. (1889), 115 N. Y. 437,
22 N. E. 360.
54 Quaere whether an agent of the company might also be proper to receive
service. The question of how long the authority of the Secretary of State will
last may arise. If the statute so provides, the agent's authority may last as long
as any liability remains outstanding in the state. See, Hunter v. Mutual Reserve
Life Ins. Co. (1906), 184 N. Y. 136, 76 N. E. 1072, aft. 218 U. S. 573, 31 S. Ct.
127; Frazier v. Steel & Tube of America (1926), 101 W. Va. 327, 132 S. E. 723.
Compare, however, Hunter v. Mut. Reserve Life Ins. Co. (1910), 218 U. S. 573,
31 S. Ct. 127, 54 L. Ed. 1155; Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co. (1936), 81
F. 2d 346; FLETCHER, § 8762.
55 See, Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. v. Boyer (1900), 62 Kan. 31, 61 P.
387; Newell v. Great Western Ry. (1869), 19 Mich. 336.
56 Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. (1933), 288 U. S. 123, 53 S. Ct. 295, 77 L.
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Directly or Indirectly. Section 1 of the act also provides that ". . in any
action or proceeding against such foreign corporation arising or growing out
of, directly or indirectly, any act or thing done by such corporation with the
State of Indiana."
This language of section 1 expressly excludes suits against foreign
corporations on foreign causes of action. The only difficulty raised
is that of giving a precise meaning to actions arising or growing in-
directly out of acts of the corporation within the state. It is settled
that suit may be maintained in the courts of a state on obligations
incurred there but breached elsewhere. 5 7 Whether the act extends
to permit consumers to sue the out of state manufacturers of goods,
the goods being sold through a local retailer and other related prob-
lems can only be answered by the courts. Seemingly the language of
the act would extend not only to causes of action arising out of entrance
into transactions, but also to claims of performance, and other conse-
quences. 5s  Reasonable, substantial connection with the jurisdiction
should be the test.5 9
Mailing of Notice. Section 1 further provides that notice of such service
and a copy of the process, writ, notice or order are to be sent by registered
mail with return receipt requested, to the principal office of the foreign corpora-
tion. Under section 3 of the act, if the corporation refuses delivery, or refuses
to sign the return receipt notice is nevertheless effected. The secretary of state
is to attach the signed receipt or refused mail to the copy of the process and mail
it to the clerk of the court for filing.
These provisions are largely precautionary, but are justifiable in
light of decisions under the non-resident motorist statutes. In one of
these cases the statute providing for service of a state official as agent
for the non-resident automobilist was held unconstitutional because it
included no provision for mailing notice to the defendant, even though
in the particular case, actual notice had been given.60 Under the
motorist statutes it has been held that a registered letter is not required
Ed. 652, 89 A. L. R. 720; Farmers Educational and Co-op. Union of America,
Minn. Div. v. Farmers Educ. and Co-op. Union of America (Minn. 1940), 289
N. W. 884.
57 L. & N. R. Co. v. Chatters (1929), 279 U. S. 320, 4-9 S. Ct. 329, 73 L. Ed.
711; noted, (1930) 5 Ind. L. J. 458.
58 See, Osborne, Arising Out of Business Done in the State (1923), 7 Minn.
380.
59 Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Fed. Reserve Bank (1922), 286 F. 566.
See Conclusion No. 6.
60 Wuchter v. Pizzutti (1928), 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 466.
And see, Consol. Flour Mills Co. v. Muegge (1928), 278 U. S. 559, 49 S. Ct. 17,
73 L. Ed. 505.
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if provision for mailing is made6'1 and that the letter need not be re-
ceived by a defendant personally. 62 In the foreign corporation cases,
however, flat rulings have been made to the effect that the statute need
contain no provision for sending notice to the corporation defendant and
that no notice actually need be received by the corporation.6 3
Under the non-resident motorist decisions again, the courts have been
inclined to be strict in the matter of the appending and filing of the
return receipt.6 4 Apparently provisions for making refusal of delivery
the equivalent of knowledge of contents, likewise are sustainable, if
the refusal is made in an attempt to evade service.6 5 Again, however,
these considerations are immaterial under the decisions that mailing
notice to foreign corporations is not necessary.
Venue. Section 6 of the act provides that "Any action or proceeding against
any foreign corporation doing business in Indiana and not licensed nor admitted
to do business in the State of Indiana may be instituted or commenced in any
county within the State of Indiana." 6 6
Domestic corporations are suable in Indiana only in counties where
an office or agency is maintained, or where a person on whom service
can be made resides.67 Foreign corporations admitted to do business
in Indiana are suable only in counties where corporate property, moneys,
credits, or effects are located. 68  In contrast with these provisions,
does section 6 involve so unreasonable a discrimination against unli-
censed foreign corporations as to be an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection of the laws or due process of law? In Power Manufacturing
Company v. Sanders6 9 the Supreme Court held an almost identical
61 State v. Belden (1927), 193 Wisc. 145, 211 N. W. 916; Jones v. Paxton
(1928), 27 F. 2d 364.
62 O'Tier v. Sell (1929), 235 N. Y. S. 534.
63 Washington v. Superior Court (1933), 289 U. S. 361, 53 S. Ct. 624, 77 L.
Ed. 1256; State v. Superior Court of Spokane County (1932), 169 Wash. 688,
15 P. 2d 660; Silva v. Crombie & Co. (N. M. 1935), 44 P. 2d 719. See note
disapproving these rulings, (1935) 49 Harv. L. R. 339. An earlier United
States Supreme Court decision indicates that a foreign corporation statute is
bad in not providing for giving notice to the corporation. See, Simon v.
Southern Ry. (1915), 236 U. S. 115, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59 L. Ed. 492.
64 Syracuse Trust Co. v. Keller (1932), 35 Del. 304, 165 A. 327; Freedman
v. Poirier (1929), 134 Misc. 253, 236 N. Y. S. 96, noted (1929) 39 Yale L. J. 126.
65 See, Culp, Recent Developments in Actions Against Nonresident Motorists
(1938), 37 Mich. L. R. 58; Wax v. Van Marter (1937), 124 Pa. Super. 573, 198
A. 537, noted (1937) 85 U. Pa. L. R. 739.
66 Italics are the writer's.
67 Burns' Ann. Stats. (1933), § 2-706.
6 Burns' Ann. Stat. (1933), § 2-708.
09 (1927) 274 U. S, 490, 47 $. Ct. 675$, 71 L, Ed. 1165.
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provision in an Arkansas statute invalid. Previously, the court had
ruled that foreign corporations could not be discriminated against as
to the county in which pre-trial examinations should be conducted. 0
If these cases are still law, section 6 is invalid. In both of these cases,
however, strong dissents were written by Justices Holmes and Brandeis.
Whether influenced by the opinions of these men or for other reasons,
in Metropolitan Insurance Company v. Brownell,71 the Supreme Court,
on the ground that the equal protection clause did not prevent reason-
able classification, 72 refused to invalidate an Indiana statute working
a discrimination against foreign insurance companies. The majority
opinion, of course, distinguishes the Power Company case, 73 but the
dissenting Justices clearly indicate that they consider the latter case
overturned. In this respect, though not as to its opinion, the dissent
seems most logical, but it will probably take another case squarely
presenting the issue to settle the conflict decisively.
CONCLUSION. Chapter 60 of the Indiana Acts of 1939 con-
tains two possible sources of unconstitutionality. These are: (1) It
attempts to subject foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of the
state courts even though the corporation's business acts within the
state would not amount to "doing business." (2) It seeks to enable
suit against unlicensed foreign corporations in any county of the state,
which is a more severe provision than that made for suits against
domestic corporations or other foreign corporations.
The seeming unconstitutionality which results from contravention of
the generality that if the foreign corporation has not consented, it may
be subjected to jurisdiction only if it is "doing business" in the state,
should not materialize. Taking jurisdiction over corporations which
have done single or occasional acts within the state is supportable as
a reasonable exercise of the states' polic power.
The discrimination against unlicensed and unadmitted foreign cor-
porations on the matter of venue of suit should not result in uncon-
stitutionality of the provision if, as is probable, former rulings of the
United States Supreme Court on this matter are not overruled.
C. B. D.
70 Kentucky Finance Corporation v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp. (1923),
262 U. S. 544, 43 S. Ct. 636, 67 L. Ed. 1112.
71 (1935) 294 U. S. 580, 55 Sup. Ct. 538, 79 L. Ed. 1070.
72 See, State v. Superior Court (1933), 289 U. S. 361, 53 S. Ct. 624, 77 L. Ed.
1256; same case (1932), 169 Wash. 688, 15 P. 2d 660. This case may very well
be said to overrule the Power Manufacturing Co. case by implication, although
it is not generally so regarded.
73 Power Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders (1927), 274 U. S. 490, 47 S. Ct. 678,
71 L. Ed. 1165.
